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~llthe proposition that inflation is a mone-
~ tary phenomenon is more widely
I embraced now than it was three decades
ago. Moreover, it is more widely accepted
that inflation is subject to long-run control
by the central hank. In recent years, the cen-
tral banks ofthe United Kingdom, New
Zealand and Canada have placed increased
emphasis on reducing their long-run infla-
tion rates. In the United States, former
Rep. Steven Neal, D.-N. Carolina (House Joint
Resolution 55. January 5, 1993). and
Sen. Connie Mack, R.-Florida, have pro-
posed making stable prices the primary
objective of the Federal Reserve.
Nevertheless, considerable opposition
reanains to making price stability the overrid-
ing objective of U.S. monetary policy Some
argtte that the benefits of price stability do
not warrant the cost ofachieving it, For
example, although extolling the virtues of
price stability, Howitt (1990) is uncertain
whether the benefits are worth the costs in
terms of lost output (temporary and perhaps
permanent, due to hysteresis effects).
Although we are skeptical whether the
empirical and theoretical analyses to date
have correctly identified all of the benefits of
price stability, this article addresses an issue
that is logically prior to this one. Specifically
it addresses the question: If the inflation rate
were zero, could society benefit from a high-
er rate ofinflation? In other words, is mod-
erate inflation preferable to price stability?
Several arguments have been advanced that
the economy benefits from moderate infla-
tion. Recently DeLong and Summers (1992)
and Summers (1991) have suggested several
rationales for why a central bank would
choose moderate inflation over price stability
as its long-run policy goal.
This article addresses four reasons that
have been suggested to prefer moderate to
zero inflation:
1. Moderate inflation enhances the stability
ofthe economy
2. Moderateinflation results in a higher
steady-state level ofoutput per person.
3. Moderate inflation increases the efficiency
of inter-industry labor market adjustments.
4. Inflation enhances the efficacy of counter-
cyclical monetary policy by allowing the
real rate ofinterest to be negative, thereby
stimulating effective demand in periods
of recession.
The first two of these arguments are well-
known to economists, hut have received
scant attention in public debates, Moreover,
they are framed within specific, although
quite different, theoretical models, so it is
possihle to provide a rather definitive evalua-
tion oftheir merit. The remaining two argu-
ments have received considerable aatention,
and may playa role in any public pohcy
debate regarding the desirability ofmaking
price stability the primary monetary policy
objective. The conceptual frameworks for
these arguments are not well-specified, how-
ever, so we try to shore up their analytical
footing hy proposing specific interpretations.
Before proceeding, several issues should
he clarified, First, the hypotheses that there
are economic benefits from moderate infla-
tion considered here iunplicitly argue against
a so-called Friedman Rule (Friedman, 1969),
that is, the “optimal” rate ofmoney growth is
one that generates steady-state deflation.
Nevertheless, this article is not specifically
about the Friedman Rule. Analyses of a
Friedman Rule generally have been carried
out in well-specified model economies.
Second, although the last two arguments
formoderate inflation lack explicit theoreri-




cal foundations, this has not prevented them
from achieving an intellectual status among
some economists and policymakers. The
lack of theoretical foundations forces our
analysis to range from the fairly technical to
the somewhat conjectural, so that we may
not provide a definitive evaluation of these
arguments. In this case, we are content to
present an analysis of these arguments.
Third, the arguments for moderate infla-
tion analyzed here are hased on the assump-
tiorn of a fully anticipated, steady-state infla-
tion. Although such inflations do nor char-
acterize real-world econotnies. we make this
assumption until it is relaxed when we dis-
cuss the reasons why price stability is prefer-
able to moderate inflation.
Fourth, the phrase “moderate inflation”
is not well-defined. Some might consider
moderate inflation to he 2 to 3 percent. For
others, any rate under 5 percent couldhe
moderate. Still others may deem anything
less than double-digit inflation moderate.
We suggest 5 percent as the break point for
moderate inflation in the United States.
Finally although we used the phrases
price stability and zero inflation interchange-
ably we are aware that price stability is dif-
ferent and more stringent than zero inflation.
Price stability implies that jumps in the price
level are reversed; zero inflation need not.
THE CASE FOR MODERATE
~N FIATlION
Is Stability ofthe Economy
Erhanctid byModerate I’nflation?
The first argument for moderate infla-
tion is that certain stability conditions are
sturdier at a high-money (nominal) rate of
interest, making the economy less vulnerable
to various shocks. Understanding this argu-
ment requires an understanding of the
notion ofstability upon which it rests. To
illustrate, suppose that the real rate of inter-
est suddenly rises, say because of an increase
in expected future profits. Given the under-
lying rare of inflation, this raises the money
rate ofinterest, reducing the quantity of real
money balances that individuals desire to
hold, As individuals attempt to reduce their
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holdings ofreal balances, prices rise still fur-
ther, fueling expectations offurther inflation.
This reduces the quantity of real balances
demanded still further, giving tise to a fur-
ther increase in prices and so cm, The ques-
nion is: Under what conditions will this
sequence converge?
i’he answer is: Self-generating inflation
cannot occur if, as the price level rises, its
rate ofchange declines, Holding the growth
of the money supply constant, thLs condition
is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows two
plots of the change in the log of the price
level, against the price level itself, P. In one
case, the slope of the curve rises with P. In
this instance, the sequence will not converge
and the ultimate solution is the trivial one;
the demand for real money balances
approaches zero, In the other case, the
slope of the curve decreases as Pincreases,
so that the sequence converges to a steady
rate ofinflation.
The argument that inflation enhances
economic stability is an argument about the
demand for money To see this argument,
assume that the demand for real money bal-
ances is solely a function ofthe nominal
interest rate, whereby the nominal interest
rare equals the constant real interest rate
plus the actual rate of inflation (which is
fully anticipated). Cagan (1956) showed
that the rate of inflation decreases as the
price level risesif a~< 1. The parameter a
is the semi-log slope of the demand for real
money balances with respect to the nominal
interest rate, that is, percent change in the
demand for real money balances per percent-
age point change in the money interest rate
(d ln(M/P)Idi). The parameter/I is the rate
at which individuals revise their expectations
of inflation under adaptive expectations,
dE/dt PUr- F), where mrand Fare the actu-
al and expected rates ofinflation, respectively.
If a/I < I and the expected rate of infla-
tion is initially greater than the actual rate,
expected inflation falls until a stable steady
state is reached at which the expected rate of
inflation is equal to the actual rate, If, how-
ever, a/I is greater than unity and actual
inflation is initially greater than expected
inflation, both expected and actual inflation
grow without limit with real balances falling.
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Log of the Price Level Vs.
Actual Price Level
log P
On the other hand, if a/I> I and actual is
initially less than expected inflation, both
actual and expected inflation fall without
limit. The steady state at which the actual
and expected rate are equal is unstable.
Stability Through Maderale Infiatian
If a and p are constants, the stability
conditions will he invariant to the steady-
state inflation rate. Consequently, the sug-
gestion that the stability conditions are stur-
dier at non-zero rates of inflation is an argu-
ment that either ao r/Iis inversely related to
the steady-state inflation rate. Specifically it
was argued that a should be smaller at high-
er rates of money interest. That this maybe
so conmes from noting that the elasticity of
the demand for real mnone)’ balances with
respect to the money interest rates, e,,,, is
equal to at, where i is the money interest
rate. Thus, if e is constant, a will dechne as
the rate of inflation and, hence, the money
interest rate rises] All other things the same,
the stability condition is more likely to be
satisfied at higher rather than lower rates of
nnoney interest if the interest elasticity
demand for real money balances is constant.
The widely used Cagan (1956) money-
demand function assunnes that a is indepen-
dent of the nominal interest rare. Cagan’s
function significantly underpredicted real
money balances during periods \vhen prices
were or had been relatively constant, hut
performed \vcll during periods of high inf La-
tion.c This suggests that the underprediction
was due to a being higher at low rates
of inflation.
That ai sinversely related to the steady-
state inflation rate is plausible, hut this does
not imply that stability is more likely at
higher rates of inflation, For example, it is
plausible that individuals revise their expec-
tations of inflation more rapidly at higher
rates of inflation, that is, that /I is positively
related to the inflation rate. Indeed, Bruno
(1989) provides some empirical support for
a positive association between /I and the rate
of inflation. Consequently it is not necessari-
ly the case that stability is greater at high
inflation rates, An inflation-induced fall in a
might hejust offset, or perhaps more than
offset, by an inflation-induced rise in /3.
Using adaptive expectations, no general con-
clusion can be reached about the stability
conditions and the steady-state inflation rate.
Getting an the Wrong Side af the
La.fter Curve
Bruno and Fischer (1990) have revisited
Cagan’s stability condition irm the context of
financing a given budget deficit solely
through seigniorage from cnoney creation.
Although assuming that the deficit is
financed solely through money creation is
not realistic in developed economies like the
United States, where other forms oftaxation
are available, the Bruno and Fischer assump-
tion is a useful theoretical device which
allows stability conditions to he anchored by
two equilibria on either side of the Laffer
curve. The Laffer curve is the recognition
that tax receipts do not increase continuous-
ly with the tax rate. Beyond soene point,
receipts decline as a further increase ira the
tax rate results in a significant erosion of the
tax base. Cormsequentlv except at that
unique tax rate where tax revenue is nnaxi-
nmized. there are two alternative tax rates and
tax bases that generate the same tax revenue:
a low tax i-ate and a high tax base, or a high
tax rate and a low tax base. Bruno and
Fischer demonstrate that if cr/I < I, a stahle
equilibrium is at the socially desirable low
tax rate-high tax base point. Ifa/I> 1, an
equilibrium is at the socially undesirable
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point on the Laffer curve. Consequently the
argument is not whether the system is stable
or explosive, but whether equilibrium is
achieved at a socially desirable point on the
Laffer curve.
What If Expectations .Are Rational?
From the condition that F = ir, it is easy
to see that rational expectations are the lim-
iting case ofadaptive expectations. Adaptive
expectations approach rational expectations
as /3 —y x, Consequently if expectations are
rational, the condition a/I < 1 cannot he sat-
isfied for any value of a. in Cagan’s world,
the system explodes. In the Bruno and
Fischer world of a fixed real deficit, a stable
equilibrium (if it exists) is achieved at a high
inflation rate on the wrong side of the Laffer
curve, Underrational expectations, any
affect on a is cotnpletely overwhelmed by /3,
which is infinite.
It appears that nothing remains ofthe
argument for stability through inflation, In
the case ofadaptive expectations, any possi-
ble reduction in a due to inflation may be
offset by an increase in /3. If expectations are
rational, an infinite /3 swamps any effect of
inflation on a. Indeed, the stable equilibri-
um is at the socially undesirable side of the
Lafier curve, that is, at a high rate of infla-
tion (tax rate) and a low level of real cash
balances (tax base). In particular, no argu-
ment can be made that moderate inflation
produces stability on the socially desirable
side of the Laffer curve.
Does Moderateinflaiian Lead to a
Higher Level ofOutput?
The second argument for moderate infla-
tion, that it leads to a higher level of steady-
state output and consumption, was first for-
mulated by Tohin (1965). The essence of
Tobin’s model is that in a growing economy
non-interest hearing real nmoney balances
augment disposable income, Given that the
propensity to save out of disposable inconae
is less than unity an increase in real bal-
ances, all of which must he saved, gives rise
to smaller saving in the form ofphysical cap-
ital. In Tohin’s portfolio-balance model, real
money balances and physical capital are sub-
stitutes. A higher anticipated rate of inflation
induces individuals to economize on their
holdings of money balances, freeing up sav-
ings for capital accumulation, This leads to
a higher steady-state capital/lahor ratio,
resulting in higher consuenprion per person
so long as the steady state is nor pushed
beyond the point where consumption per
person is maximized (the so-called Golden
Rule point).
The Tohin effect, that higher inflation
induces higher levels of capital, output and
consumption per worker, is open to a number
of objections. For one thing, it is dependent
on Tohin’s assumption that savings are a con-
stant proportion of inconme. If the savings
rate is directly reduced by higher inflation,
the Tohin effect can be reversed—even in the
framework of Tohin’s model (Dornbusch and
Frenkel, 1973), Moreover, the Tohin effect is
model-specific. The effect is absent in
Ramsey-type models, in which the marginal
product of capital is tied to the representa-
tive agent’s rate of time preference. In such
models, the marginal product of capital
defines a unique steady-state capital\labor
ratio which is independent of the level of
real money balances, It is now generally rec-
ognized that the results ofboth Tohin- and
Ramsey-type models are sensitive to small
changes in assumptions. Moreover’,
Orphanides and Solon’ (1990) show that
different anodels or small changes in assumnp-
tions in a particular enodel deliver disparate
conclusions about the Tobin effect.
Consequently, it is impossible as a matter of
pure theory to make a conmpelling case that
inflation increases real output.
A crucial reason for the fragility of these
results is that, by their very nature, these
money-growth models are the wrong vehi-
cles for analyzing the role of money in the
economy and, hence, the effect ofinflation
on the economy A striking examnple of this
is provided by Tobin’s model, which predicts
that the highest level ofoutput per person
occurs in a barter economy in \vhich hold-
ings of real money balances are nil. This
result stems from not taking money serious-
ly Real money balances reduce transaction
costs. They do this by overcoming the dou-
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ble coincidence ofwants associated with
barter and by conveying information (for
example, Brunner and Meltzer, 1971).
Compared to a barter economy the reduction
in total transaction costs permits society to
devote more ofits scarce resources to produc-
tion, raising output and the consumption of
goods and leisure. Byreducing marginal
transaction costs, money also results in a
higher level of trade and correspondingly
higher levels of output. Although the devel-
opment of Solow-type growth models was an
important first step in the analysis ofgrowing
economies, it is not surprising that these one-
commodity models fail to capture the impor-
tant role that money plays in real-world
economies.
Thus far, we have contrasted money and
non-monetary barter economies. In princi-
ple, similar effects occur when individuals
are induced by a rise in anticipated inflation
to reduce their holdings ofreal balances. If
inflation induces individuals to hold fewer
real balances, even if one were to accept
Tobin’s argument that inflation increases out-
put per person, any increase would be at the
expense of a loss to society of the services of
real balances. In fact, if money enters the
production function, the Tobin effect may
well he reversed; inflation then reduces out-
put per person, as in Srockman (1981).
Inflation may nor only reduce the steady-
stare level of per capita output, it may reduce
the growth rate ofoutput itself, For if capital
is appropriately defined more broadly to
include human capital, as is done in recent
endogenous-growrh models, inflation reduces
investment in human capital, as well as in
physical capital. Reduced investment in
human capital lowers the growth of efficien-
cy per person, which reduces the growth rate
itself (for example, Lucas, 1988; King and
Rebelo. 1990; and Dotsey and Ireland, 1993).
A small hut permanent reduction in the
growth rate due to inflation has an adverse
effect on output levels, This continual effect
on output levels is more significant than any
effect of inflation on the one-time altering of
the level ofoutput per capita exploredin ear-
lier exogenous-growth models.
Once we leave purely theoretical-growth
models, and look at real-world economies,
we must deal with how inflation interacts
with real-world institutions, Ir has been
shown that the interaction ofinflation with a
less-than-fully indexed tax system works to
discourage capital accumulation (Feldstein,
1976, 1979; and Tatom, 1976).
The bottom line is that even within the
framework oftheoretical-growth models, the
Tobin effect is subject to small changes in
assumptions. When real-world insrimntions
are included in the analysis, the weight of
evidence is that inflation discourages capital
accumulation. The Tobin effect is reversed.°
When capital is defined more realistically to.
include human capital, the effect ofinflation
is to continually reduce the levels ofoutput
per person below what they would have been
under stable prices.
Does Moderate Inflation Enhance
Relative Real-V-/age Adjustments?
The third argument for moderate infla-
tion (Tobin, 1972; Schultze, 1985; Lucas,
1989; DeLong and Summers, 1992; and
Summers, 1991) asserts that declines in the
price of commodities and in the real wage of
workers specialized to a particular industry
can be madewith less friction in a world
with moderate inflation than in a world of
stable prices. It is argued that under moder-
ate inflation, the decline in a product’s price
and in the real wage rare ofworkers can be
accomplished through a rise in prices and
money wages elsewhere.
The belief that inter-industry adjust-
mnenms are smoother under a regime of mod-
erate inflation rests on the view that laborers
prefer a rise in the prices ofwage goods to an
absolute reduction in money wages. But
why should this he the case? Workers expe-
rience an identical decline in real wages in
homlm cases.
One answer depends on the existence of
a money illusion: A decline in real wages
brought about by a rise in the prices of wage
goods is incorrectly perceived as smaller
than the same decline in the real wage that
occurs throttgh a reduction in money wages.
The persistence of mnoney illusionin a steady
state of anticipated moderate inflation is dif-
ficult to rationalize. Moreover, recent cvi-
After m servey of theetetml mod-
els, Blenclard ned Fisclet (19891
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dence (i\ cLaughlin, 1994; and Lebow,
Stockton and Wascher, 1993) suggests there
is no dearth ofnominal wage curs, even dur-
ing periods ofmoderate inflation.
Furthermore, firms in a declining indus-
try may adjust workers’ compensation with-
out cutting wages. Compensation includes
benefits and perks which can be adjusted rel-
atively easily relative to wages in cases in
which workers have an irrational fear of
nominal wage curs. In any event, we believe
that for the resistance to nominal wage
cuts to be widespread, it must he motivated
byconsiderations deeper than a pure
moneyillusion.
One possible rationale for such resis-
rance is that workers feel they have some
control over money wages but no control
over the general price level. Consequently
the same reduction in the real wage rate
due to reduction in money wages brings into
play factors that workers believe they can
negotiate, in contrast to an increase in
the prices ofwage goods, which they are
powerless to affect.
The second possible motivation would
interact with the first, Workers may have
less knowledge of demand rhan do employ-
ers. Consequently when the industry
demand declines, workers nmay be concerned
that the employer is misrepresenting the true
state ofnature to force an unnecessary
reduction in money wages. In this case, a
fall in the real wage rate due to a rise in the
prices of wage goods elsewhere avoids trig-
gering a signal-extraction problem.
We have endeavored to make the best
possible case for moderate inflation as a
device for smoothing inter-industry wage
adjustments, hut in doing so, we have
ignored the existence of a cushion on money
wage declines even in a regime ofstable
prices. If we were to introduce technical
progress, even under price stability the aver-
age level of money wages would rise at a rate
equal to the average increase in output per
person. This provides a cushion mitigating
the need for an absolute decline in the
money wage.
Finally we suggesr the hypothesis that
workers’ resistance to nomninal wage cuts is
not independent 0f the inflation regime in
which they live. Understable prices, such
cuts may become more frequent and workers
will become more accustomed to and less
distrustful of money wage cuts. Accordingly
any “lubricant” that moderare inflation may
provide to ease labor marketfrictions will
become increasingly unnecessany in a zero-
inflation regime.
Although the claim that moderate infla-
tion facilitates inter-industry wage adjust-
ments cannot be definitively rejected, it does
not rest on compelling theoretical or empiri-
cal foundations, In any event, monetary pol-
icy is an inappropriate and ineffective instru-
ment for dealing with labor markerprob-
lems, such as market frictions or the sub-
oprimaliry of the natural unemployment rate.
The latter may be due to taxes on wages
which make the after-tax real wage smaller
than the before-rax marginal product of
labor. The socially optimal amount of
employment equates the disutility of labor to
the before-tax real wage so that after-tax
employment is sub-optimal. Moreover, high
unemployment compensation increases time
spent in “search unemployment.” The drift
to higher unemployment in Europe and
Canada is unlikely to reflect a movement up
a short-run Phillips curve produced by unan-
ticipated deflation, but rather is due to an
upward drift in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. In this case, appropriate policies to
reduce unemployment are reforms in taxes
and unemployment compensation, nor mon-
etary policy
Moderate Infiaticyn Enhances the
Cauntei-cyclical Iifhccxy at
Monetary Policy
A fourth argument formoderate steady-
stare inflation is that it enhances the counter
cyclical efficacy of monetary policy by
enabling the Federal Reserve to make the
real rare of interest negative. The argument
that the efficacy of monetary policy is
enhanced by a onoderate rate of steady-state
inflation stems from the recognition that the
money rate can never he negative, so that in
a non-inflationary environment, in which the
real and money rates are equal, the best that
monetary policy can do is to drive both the
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real and nominal rates of inrerest to zero,4
DeLongand Summers (1992) and Summers
(1991) argue rhar in a zero inflation
regime, monetary policy will be unable to
produce a sufficiently large reduction in the
real interest rate to restore full employ-
ment in times oflarge adverse shocks to
aggregate demand.
Is this an important argument for mod-
erate inflation? There are several reasons to
think not, First, the argument is based on
the belief that the monetary authority can
exert considerable influence over real inter-
est rates rhrough the so-called liquidity
effect, and that monetaey policy works pri-
marily if nor solely through its ability to
influence the real interest rate. According to
this view, an expansionary monetary policy
drives real interest rates down, inducing an
increase in spending. But the extent and
duration of the effect of monetary policy on
short-term real interest rates is controversial,
theoretically and empirically The exchange
between Ohanian and Stockman (1995) and
Hoover (1995) highlights the difficulties
with theoretical models of the liquidity
effect, The empirical evidence on the liquid-
ity effect is mixed. Workby Reichensrein
(1987), Thornton (1988), Gordon and
Leeper (1994) and Pagan and Robertson
(1995) suggests the liquidity effect is rela-
tively weak and short-lived, although
research by Chrisriano and Eichenhaum
(1991,1992), Cook and Hahn (1989) and
Romer and Romer (1990) suggest a more
significant effect of monetary policy on real
short-term interest rates.
Second, it is difficult to argue that suffi-
cient investment opportunities will nor exist
unless the real rate is negative. The issue is
whether the economic outlook can become
sufficiently pessimistic that the expected real
return on longer-term investments is nega-
tive. That DeLong and Summers (1992) and
Summers (1991) have raised it again sug-
gests that this old debare is far from settled.
Bailey (1971) argues that there will always
he some investments that yield a snmall non-
negative return, even if a depressed economy
were not expected to return to its steady-
state growth path for a period of 10 to 20
years. If investment opportunities increase
sufficiently ar very low but positive interest
rates, the efficacy of monetary policy is nor
impaired by a zero lower bound on the real
interest rare. Bailey’s argument suggests that
credit demand becomes very large (essential-
ly infinite) at very low real interest rates, so
that the real longer-term interest rates do
not have to be negative to significantly
increase investment.
Finally despite the etnpirical evidence
to the contrary there appears to he a fairly
widespread belief that the Federal Reserve
exerts considerable influence overreal short-
term interest rates, hum much less influence
overlonger-term interest rates (see, for
example, Goodfriend, 1993; and Greenspan,
1993). If monetary policy cannot make the
long-term rate negative, it is natural to ask:
Is rhere any gain from the possibility that the
Federal Reserve may he able to make short-
term interest rates negative for temporary
periods? In markets in which there are few
impediments to the flow offunds between
the long and short end of the market, consis-
tency ofexpectations requires that the cur-
rent long-term interest rate be equal to the
expected average of future short-term rates
plus a risk premium. The risk premium
is affected by a number of things, including
uncertainty about future short-term
interest rates.
If the market believes that the policy
does nor signal an increase irm policymakers’
desired steady-state inflation rates, people
know that today’s policy must give rise to
reversals later. Whether the difference in the
magnitude of the decline and subsequent rise
in short-term interest rates in the zero and
moderate inflation regimes will result in sig-
nificantly different paths for real long-term
interest rates under the two reginmes is
impossible to determine, a priori. Indeed, it
is as easy to conjecture scenarios in which
there would he no difference in the response
of long-term real interest rates under the two
steady-state inflation regimes as it is to con-
jecture scenarios in which there would he a
significanr difference.’
Given that it is unlikely that moderare
inflation will enable the Federal Reserve to
have a significantly larger effect on long-term
real interest rates, and that very low or zero
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lar fer, soy, 95 teats a year Item
tom, so long os tie some butt
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real interest rates are likely to be sufficient
for the Fed to offset adverse aggregate de-
mand shocks, the argument that moderate
inflation enhances the efficacy of monetary
policy seems doubtful. If some role for infla-
tion uncertainty is factored in, the idea that
moderate inflation enhances the efficacy of
monetarypolicy becomes even more tenuous.
Why Zero inflation Is Preferable
Although mnany estimate the output loss-
es ofmoderate inflation to be modest, this
issue is far from settled. In addition to the
usual problems ofmeasuring the permanent
output losses, Dorsey and Ireland (1993)
have shown that in a general-equilibrium
analysis, the usual effects of inflation (the
inefficient economizing on real money bal-
ances, substituting market activity for
leisure, and redirecting resources from goods
production to financial activities) compound
to produce a significant output loss. Dorsey
and Ireland’s result stems in part from the
fact that inflation lowers real output growth.
Although the effects on output growth
appear small, compounded over time, they
are significant.
Another compelling reason to prefer
zero inflation is that higher inflation is asso-
ciated with increased variability ofboth
inflation and relative prices. The increased
variability of inflation and consequent infla-
tion uncertainty shorten contract lengths,
thereby increasing contract costs. The
greater variability also contaminates price
signals, so theprice system conveys less
information. As the variability of inflation
(associated with higher inflation) increases,
it becomes more difficult to determine
whether a particular commodiry price
change reflects a movement in the general
price level, or a real shIft in supply or demand
resulting from taste and productivity shocks.
In addition, inflation and the higher
variability of the general price level cause a
reallocation ofresources from the production
of goods to financial services for the sole
purpose ofhedging against inflation. Even if
there is no reduction in conventional mea-
sures of oumpur, inflation produces a distor-
non ofoutput. The banking system and
financial service industries expand relative to
other employment ofresources such as
industrial output, and households sacrifice
leisure to reduce their real balances when the
inflation tax rises. These effects call into
question the notion than, bypenalizing the
consumption ofpriced commodities, infla-
tion reduces work effort and increases leisure.
Although it is difficult to quantify the
degree to which inflation impairs the ability
ofthe price system to signal correct informa-
tion, there isno doubt that the price system
allocates resources most efficiently in the
absence ofinflation.
Moreover, zero inflation is preferable to
moderate inflation because inflation, even
moderate inflation, distorts accounting, legal
contracts and the tax system. Inflation also
distorts the true cost of inventories, the
depreciation of plant and equipment, as well
as the rime profile of real mortgage pay-
ments, and other fixed-dollar denominated
contracts.
Of course, this analysis assumes that
taxes and private contracts are not indexed
against inflation. Why in may be asked,
don’t the authorities index taxes against
changes in the price level so that real pay-
ments are unaffected? Why in turn, doesn’t
the private sector index wages and finan-
cial contracts to nullify the impact of
price changes?
In fact, the tax code is now partly
indexed against inflation, Indexanion, how-
ever, is often taken as a signal that the
authorities are giving up the battle against
inflation, This was the basis for the outspo-
ken opposition to indexarion by former
Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns and
why the Bank of Canada has opposed index-
anon, It is easy to construct examples in
which inflation-mitigating schemes, such as
indexanion by reducing the marginal costs of
inflation, lead to an increase in the aggregate
inflation rate, Moreover, foregoing indexa-
non may he a help in developing a reputa-
tion for credibly pursuing anri-inllation poli-
cies (see, for example, Fischer and Summers,
1989). For these reasons, it is not clear that
indexanion of tax codes is desirable.
In the private sector, indexarion is
unlikely to occur. At the hearr ofthe diffi-
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culty is a coordination problem. To be suc-
cessful, indexanion must be implemented by
a large number of diverse firms facing different
informnation, For example, are price changes
due no nominal or real variables? Iris well-
known that indexing money wages to changes
in prices due no real shocks is undesirable,°
Are price changes permanent or transitory?
Are the price changes industry-specific or
global? It is unlikely that individuals will
agree on the cause of a price change and
then coordinate their actions. Given these
obstacles, indexation in the private sector is
difficult and, hence, fairly rare. Moreover, in
instances in which private indexanion is fair-
ly widespread, as in Israel, in reduces the
resolve to fight escalatinginflation.
Finally in is imnpossihle to fully index
real cash balances against inflation, as previ-
ously discussed, because inflation leads peo-
ple to hold fewer cash balances and results in
a loss of their services,’ For these reasons,
indexation is a frail reed on which to rest
hopes ofmitigating inflation’s effects,
Price Stability as the Objective of
Manetary Polk,v
Reducing an established moderate infla-
tion trend may disrupt economic activity
producing temporary output and employ-
ment losses. Given an established moderate
inflation rate, Howitt (1990, p. 104) argues
than despite the desirability ofzero inflation,
the cost ofachieving in probably outweighs
the benefits. This arguenenc against moving
to price stability ignores the inflationary bias
(amid resulting uncertainty) that characterizes
policy regimes motivated by concerns for
transitional output and employment losses.
In the absence of a commitment to sta-
ble prices, a central hank concerned about
transitional unemployment is likely to
respond asymmetrically to shocks—tempo-
rary or permanent. This asymmetric behav-
ior has clear implications for the price level
in the case of demand shocks, A mnonenary
authority concerned with transitional unenm-
ployment will he less willitmg no offset a
demand shock that raises prices and employ-
nmenr than no offset an adverse demand shock
than lowers prices and employment.
This asymmetric behavior extends to
supply shocks as well,~ Adverse shocks will
he accommodated; favorable ones will be
ignored. Although the price level depends
on many factors, including the relative inci-
dence of positive and negative shocks, con-
cern for transitional unemployment leads a
central hank no pursue policies that will
cause the price level to he higher than it
would be otherwise.
This asymmetric behavior creates an
inflationary bias with the potential for accel-
erating inflation, As inflation increases, the
monetary authority may be forced to tolerate
transitional unemployment to hring the
inflation down. Indeed, this appears no be
what happened in the United States in the
late 1970s and on a smaller scale in the late
1980s, The best way to avoid such disrup-
tions is to coonmir to a policy ofstable prices.
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed several argunments in
favor ofmoderate inflation and we find them
to be lacking theoretically and, in some
instances, empirically The first arguenent,
that nmoderane inflation enhances economic
stability, is subject no compelling objections.
If expectations are adaptive, any decline in
the semi-elasticity ofmoney demand associ-
ated with a higher inflation may well be off-
set by a more rapid revision of inflationary
expectations. If expectations are rational,
this must be the case.
The argument than inflation leads no a
higher level of output isbased on theoretical
models that are non robust to small specifica-
tion changes. When real-world institutions
are taken into account, the weight of the evi-
dence is that inflation discourages capital
accumulation. When capital is defined to
include huonan capital, inflation may reduce
not only the level of output per capitahut ins
rare ofgrosvnh as well.
Also suspect is the proposition that
moderate inflation increases the efficacy of
mnonetary policy by allowing the central
hank no make the real rare of interest nega-
tive. Sufficient investment opportunities are
likely no exist at very low’ but positive real
tie antlettes in lsmael irdeoed
money wages to a price index
wfrici included imported goods. In
fact, imported goods should iv
excluded since cionges in import
prices reflect ciaoges im a reel tori
able, the terms of trede. later on,
RE mistoke was mctied eel
terms of trade effects mere euclud-
ed from the pi cc index.
Ira principle, to maoimize tic ser-
vices of meal Ideates, tmould In
desiraile to lone prices fell at the
reoi rate of interust ondset the
money rate of interest to zero.
People mould tiun be induced to
hold the sotiety queetry of reel id-
ences. It would teke us too for
ofield, homeren to discuss the rarer-
its of defiaton utthe reel note in
comparison with stoile prices.
Iherefore, me confine out attenter
to a compoisan of zero witi mod-
erate inflation.
In the case of the oil sled in thu
1 970s lee adomse supply siock
which tunded to raise infiotiorm and
reduce autpttl, a numier of ucone
mists advocated e tunmtum
increase in the stock of muney to
offset a potnotiel iocreosn it uten
ploymunt. On tie otier land, luom
meey names ‘mere raised in fonor of
o redoctoo in tie money stock
mien OPFC coiopsed?
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interest rates. Consequently negative real and,,,,,,,,,. “fdtntificotion mnd tie liquidity Efftct oft
races are non required no nmake enonenary pol— Monetary Polity Shock,” Nationoi Bureau of Economic Researci
icy effective. Also, even if positive inflation Working Paper No. 3920(19911.
enabled the Fed no make real shorn—term Cook, Timothy, and Thomos Hohn. ‘The Effect of Cionges in the
interest rates negative, such actions ma)’ not Federal Funds Rate Target at Market Merest Rates in the 1 97Os,’
lower long—term interest rates. Journalof Monetary Econonuirs (November 1989), pp. 331-51.
The proposition that moderateinflation
eases inter—industry wage adjustments is DeLong, I. Bradford, and Iamrence H. Summers. ‘Mocroeconomic Polity tad Long-Run Growth,’ Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
weak coo. One argunmenn rests on the exis- Economic Review (fourth quarter 1992), pp. 5-29.
nence of a money illusion; we see no econom-
ic rationale for money illrtsion in the steady Dornbusti, Rudiger, tad Jacob A. Frenkol. ‘Inflation ond Growth:
state. If tIme asserted resistance to nominal Alternative Approaches,’ Journal of Money, Creditand Banking
wage cuts is based on a deeper motivation, (February 1973), pp. 141-56.
we suggest that in should disappear entirely Datsey, Michael, and Peter Ireland. ‘On the Wefore Cast il Inflation it
as the regime of zero inflation persists. General Equilibrium,’ unpublished manuscript (August 1993), Federal
Moreover, the evidence suggests than nominal Resorve lank of Ricimand.
wage cursare frequent even during periods of
fnldstein, Mann S. ‘the Welfare Cast of Permanent Inflolion and moderate inflation. Hence, the conjecture
Optmml Short-Run Economic Policy,’ Journal ofPolitical Economy
nhan workers resist nominal wage cuts lacks (August 1979), pp. 149-68.
both theoretical and empirical justification.
Finally, we argue that a policy ofliving ~. ‘Infloten, Itnamo Taxes, and the Rate of Interest: A
winh inflation cannon he rationalized on the Theoretical Analysis,’The American Economic Review (December
grounds chat nhere are transitory ounpun 1976), pp. 809-20.
costs associated with reducing inflation, A Fischer, Stanley, and Lawrence H, Summers, ‘Should Nations learn to
policy unotivared by concern for transitional Live with Inflation?’ The American Economic Review (May 1989),
unemploynmenn is likely no have inflanionary pp. 382-87.
bias that will erode a commitment no any
price objective. Friedman, Milton. ‘The Optimum Otanfity of Money,’ in The Optimum
Quantity of Money and OtherEssays. Aldino Publishing Co., 1969.
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